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# REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION CONCERNING HAITI

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in response to the statement adopted by the Council on 11 October 1993, in which the latter requested me to report urgently to it whether the incidents of 11 October constituted serious and consistent non-compliance by the Armed Forces of Haiti with the Governors Island Agreement.

2. The incidents of 11 October 1993, which prevented the deployment of a contingent of the military component of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) arriving on board the vessel Harlan County, were the culmination of a situation which had been deteriorating in Haiti in recent weeks.

3. The evidence of this deterioration is as follows:

(a) The repeatedly observed lack of will on the part of the command of the Armed Forces of Haiti to facilitate the deployment and operation of UNMIH. Ignorance of the meaning and scope of UNMIH has, in particular, been claimed, in spite of the assent of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti to the explanations provided during the discussions which took place on Governors Island in July 1993 and during the visits to Haiti of various bilateral and United Nations missions to explain the arrangements for United Nations assistance in modernizing Haiti's armed forces and police.

(b) Administrative obstacles created to delay the start of the Mission.

4. This bad will was even more apparent in the incidents which occurred on 11 October 1993. All the necessary commitments had been obtained in writing from the military and port authorities in Port-au-Prince. Nevertheless, the port was blocked and the vessel was unable to dock. The port authorities denied having had any contact with United Nations representatives and left a clear field for the action of armed civilians, who committed countless acts of intimidation, fired into the air, made threats against Haitian and international journalists and committed hostile acts against representatives of the international community. In spite of repeated appeals to the heads of Haiti's armed forces and police, General Cédras and Lieutenant-Colonel Michel François, nothing was done to bring the situation under control.

5. The lack of will to take action against groups of armed civilians who had gained control and were sowing terror in Haiti had already been observed on

numerous occasions, particularly when Antoine Izméry was assassinated on 11 September 1993. The police had at every turn facilitated the actions of the perpetrators of the assassination, as the Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) has reported.

6. This was also the case with the serious incidents which occurred near the Hôtel Christopher in Port-au-Prince on 5 October, when offices of the Prime Minister were attacked by armed civilians, with the participation of members of the police force, who allowed acts of vandalism to be carried out. MICIVIH monitors counted approximately 200 armed civilians operating with the police.

7. On Thursday, 7 October, a general strike was declared "against UNMIH" on the proposal of a group known as the Front pour l'avancement et le progrès d'Haiti (FRAPH). On numerous occasions this group has threatened the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet, the representative of the Secretary-General and French and Canadian personnel of UNMIH. During the strike, which was condemned by the Haitian Government and by Haitian society, the city of Port-au-Prince was paralysed by the violent activities of groups of armed civilians, who, among other things, forced merchants to close their stalls. MICIVIH monitors observed that armed civilians and police personnel brandishing automatic weapons or pointing them at passers-by were often seen riding together in vehicles which were criss-crossing the town.

8. Most of the instructions issued by the Government of Haiti to the Haitian armed forces and police have not been carried out, which, in my view, constitutes a clear violation of the principle of the subordination of military forces to civilian authority, which is a central feature of the Governors Island Agreement. The examples given above reflect a lack of will on the part of Haiti's military authorities to "cooperate fully in the peaceful transition to a ... democratic society" in accordance with the Governors Island Agreement. They also reflect the clear and explicit intent to prevent the democratic process, as accepted in that Agreement, from taking its course.

9. Accordingly, in the light of paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 861 (1993), which states that the Security Council "confirms its readiness, as noted in the letter from the President of the Council of 15 July 1993 (S/26085), to terminate immediately the suspension of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above if, at any time, the Secretary-General, having regard for the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, informs the Security Council that the parties to the Governors Island Agreement or any other authorities in Haiti have not complied in good faith with the Agreement", I must inform the Council that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti, as one of the parties to the Agreement, and the police chief and commander of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, as one of the "authorities in Haiti" have failed to fulfil the commitments entered into by General Cédras in his capacity as co-signatory of the Governors Island Agreement.

10. In the light of all the foregoing facts, which reflect serious and consistent non-compliance with the Governors Island Agreement, and having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, I consider it necessary, in accordance with resolution 861 (1993), to terminate the suspension of the measures set out in paragraphs 5 to 9 of resolution 841 (1993).

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